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11.

THm SELECTION OF TOPICS AND METHODS FOR LAW
AND SOCIAL SCIENCE S RESEARCH

A.

Presentations

PROFESSOR WALKER: It gives me pleasure to introduce our
first speaker, Professor Hans Zeisel of the University of Chicago Law
School.,
PROFESSOR ZEISEL: The lead-off man in vaudeville, in baseball, or in a conference has the "tough spot." This is especially true
in a conference with a topic as difficult as this one. We select our
research topics as we swim or ride a bicycle; we do it, but we don't
give much thought about how we do it. Yet, one of the major responsibilities of a scholar is to decide what he wants to study, and this conference is a useful and challenging opportunity to reflect on this rather
important issue.
In trying to find out what a good selection is, I went over three
sources. One was the projects which the National Science Foundation
had asked me to review. I reread my memoranda in which I tried
to be explicit about the merits and shortcomings of each proposal. My
second source was my own research; I tried to recall bow I selected
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my topics. Finally, I looked back at all the published investigations
in our field to determine which of them, in retrospect, were successful and which were not.
From these sources I tried to formulate some general thoughts
about what makes a topic well chosen. Such discussion involves value
judgments. To avoid, however, too personal a view, I propose to begin by recalling some of the studies that have left a major impact on
our efforts and some that have failed in this respect. From this review, we can perhaps learn from our joint experience what to watch
out for.
Let me begin with a series of early studies that I have always
considered eminently important and successful: the American Bar
Foundation series on the various phases of the law enforcement process. Under the editorship of Frank Remington they have become
standard works in their respective fields.' Their research design was
simple, almost naive: the investigator and his helpers went into the
field, watched policemen, prosecutors, and judges in their daily routine, talked to them, and eventually recorded the multitude of motives
and considerations behind the crucial decisions of arrest, pleading
guilty, and sentencing. Why are these volumes so important? They
were important because every one of them took on a topic about
which we knew almost nothing until these studies appeared. They
threw first light into some of the many dark comers of our law enforcement process. Their pioneering showed those who came later
what to look for and, if they wanted to progress into the sphere of quantitative analysis, what to count. Thus if a dark comer promises to be
interesting, first explorations, however simple, have an ineradicable
charm and usefulness. Now another dark area currently being explored is the entire field of administrative decision-making. Although
we teach administrative law, we know little about how in fact administrative decisions are being made.
At the other end of the spectrum are studies that aim at answering very narrow and precise questions of legal interest. I am thinking,
for instance, of Thorsten Sellin's careful compilation and analysis of
data on the deterrent effect of the death sentence. 3 He compared
neighboring states with and without the death penalty and attempted
to trace the effects of its abolition and of reintroduction. I mention
2. [Ed.] AMERICAN BAR FOUNDrATION, ADmiNST'ATrON

SERI S (F. Remington ed.).
3. [Ed.] T. SELLIN, THE DEATH PENALTY (1959).
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this study here because it was one of the few in our field that has
powerfully aided law reform. First in Great Britain by Sellin's testimony before the Royal Commission, and later here in the United
States, his study is invariably in the forefront whenever the capital
punishment issue is discussed. In passing, let me say that this type
of research into secondary sources is relatively inexpensive and none
the poorer in quality for it.
Let me mention in this context another set of investigations that
had, and perhaps will continue to have, influence on our legal system
precisely because they addressed a narrow question. The question
was whether jurors who are against capital punishment are less likely
to convict a defendant, compared to jurors who are in favor of capital punishment. The former, until the United States Supreme Court's
decision in Witherspoon,4 had been excluded from juries in capital
cases. Even after Witherspoon jurors who are absolutely opposed to
the death penalty are not allowed to sit on such cases. These studies,
now numbering about half a dozen,5 are interesting for another reason. Because of the difficulties of real experimentation, all but one
of these studies were forced to proceed largely under simulated conditions-a clear drawback. But all six studies, although different in
method and approach, confirmed the existence of the relationship between approval of capital punishment and propensity to favor the prosecution. Thus by triangulation each study supports the others, jointly
creating a high level of confidence. This is still a rare pattern in our
field but one that is commonplace in other, more developed sciences:
duplicating studies designed to confirm earlier findings or to detect
error, whatever it may be. Since the resolving power of the social
sciences is, on the whole, small, the need for duplication and control
is therefore great. This should be another consideration in choosing
a topic.
The mushrooming of studies on the effect of reducing the size
of juries from twelve to six is another more recent example of desirable duplication.6 The impetus toward duplication came from two
4. [Ed.] Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968).
5. [Ed.] E.g., Bronson, On the Conviction Proneness and Rcpresentativeness of
the Death-QualifiedJury: An EmpiricalStudy of Colorado Veniremen, 42 U. CoLo. L.
REv. 1 (1970); Goldberg, Toward Expansion of Witherspoon: Capital Scruples, Jury
Bias, and the Use of Psychological Data to Raise Legal Presumptions, 5 HArry. CIV.
RiGns-Crv. LIB. L. REv. 53 (1970).
6. [Ed.] E.g., Pabst, What do Six-Member Juries Really Save?, 57 JoDicAnTrn
6 (1973); Pabst, Statistical Studies of the Costs of Six-man Versus Twelve-man Juries,
14 Wm. & MARY L. Rnv. 326 (1972); Rosenblatt & Rosenblatt, Six Man Juries in
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sources. First, the problem fits into an important social science tradition-small group research-and allows the small group investigators,
perhaps for the first time, to deal with groups answering real and serious questions instead of game-questions or questions contrived for the
occasion. The second impetus comes from an intense legal interest
in this particular issue.
There are other studies, many of modest size, which took on urgent problems and eventually produced reform. I am thinking, for
instance, of Marvin Wolfgang's pioneering attack on the insufficiencies of the FBI's Uniform Crime Reports. 7 Crime statistics are an important yardstick of our social well-being, and such research efforts
aimed at immediate improvements are often highly desirable.
Then there is the New Jersey pretrial experiment, conducted by
Professor Rosenberg, designed to find out whether pretrial conferences
in civil litigation help to settle claims. 8 The experiment showed that
the optional pretrial conference eliminates just as many cases from trial
as the obligatory conference and requires less court time. It dealt
with an urgent issue, and its result proved that the majority view was
wrong. Somehow, such a result is always more interesting although
it should not matter where the truth lies. This study was also the first
controlled experiment in our field. The opportunity for performing
a controlled experiment should always be attractive: it is the most perfect instrument in our tool chest, and it is important that we try to
expand its application in studying the legal system.
In a way, the Jury Project of the University of Chicago Law
School was also a controlled experiment: we observed the differences
in the outcome of trials depending on whether they were tried before
a jury or before a judge. But since a real case can be tried only once,
we obtained the comparison by asking the presiding judge in each trial
how he would have decided the case if it had been a bench trial. The
judge provided a meaningful standard of comparison because under
our laws he is the only realistic alternative to the jury.
The Jury Project was a large enterprise in many meanings of the
term. It was concerned with an important legal institution; it was opCriminal Cases: Legal and Psychological Considerations, 47 ST. JON'Is L. REv. 615
(1973); Note, The Effect of Jury Size on the Probability of Conviction: An Evaluation of Williams v. Florida,22 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 529 (1971).
7. [Ed.] Wolfgang, Uniform Crime Reports: A Critical Appraisal, 111 U. PENN.
L. REV. 708 (1963).
8. [Ed.] M. RosENBERo, THE PrRIAL CONFERENCE AND FxECnVE Jus=TCE
(1964).
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erating on a major grant; and it extended over many, too many, years.
It is only fair to say that although it has been a seminal study, it has
had some impact. There was hardly a decision of the United States
Supreme Court dealing with the jury that did not refer to The American Jury9 -mostly in the dissent, I should add. In one case, to our
embarrassment, or perhaps pride, we were cited in both the opinion
and the dissent.
Let me now turn to studies which I believe to have been poor
choices. When social sciences research into the legal system had just
begun, Underhill Moore began to investigate with a formidable apparatus
the question of how people will react to variations in fines for illegal
parking.' ° It was undertaken at the time when psychologists were
much interested in learning theory, and the law, it was felt, provided
a good context for studying it. When it was all done, the study
showed the speed and the extent to which car owners responded to
these variations in deterrence. It has been a study that influenced
neither psychology nor the law; it fell between the chairs.
Other studies that, at least in retrospect, have failed are the many
ambitious efforts to search for the causes of crime. The point came
to light when in the early Thirties the Carnegie Foundation considered
large-scale financing of criminological studies and commissioned two
distinguished scholars, Jerome Michael of Columbia University, and
Mortimer Adler of the University of Chicago, to survey the field. The
resulting book, Crime, Law and Social Science," offered a devastating
review of failure. Since not much has been added to our knowledge
in this area in the intervening forty years, we may conclude that the
question perhaps is too big for the tools in our possession. A very
important problem may be a poor choice if the expectation of solving
it is minimal.
Let me try to formulate some general conclusions. The first
conclusion is that the distinction between basic research and applied
research is not very relevant to our field. What matters is that we
have an important question or at least an interesting one. Then we
must ask: "Important and interesting to whom? At the very least
it should be interesting and important to the legal system. It should
be interesting to the scholar because unless he is deeply engaged,
he will do a poor job.
9. [Ed.] H. KALvE, &H. Zms.L, THE AmR.icAN JURY (1966).
10. [Ed.] U. MooRE & C. CALLAAN, LAW AND LEARNNG: A STUDY IN LEGAL
CONTROL (1943).

11. [Ed.] J.MICHAEL & M. ADLER, CRimE, LAW Arm SOCIAL SCmNCE (1933).
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The second conclusion is that the question to be investigated
ought to have an answer. One of the facts of life in social sciences
research is that the bigger the question, the more unlikely you are
to come up with the answer. It would be nice to know, for instance,
how to avoid war, or how to abolish crime, but it isn't possible. The
tools of social science research are geared to modest questions, to the
middle range of questions, not to the big questions.
Social science methodology has greatly improved during the last
thirty years. If forty years ago a social scientist told a judge, "Since
so many of your decisions are based on what you believe their effect
will be, you should let us social scientists help you," the judge could
have rightly replied, "Do you think because you call yourself a social
scientist you know more about society than I, who sees society daily
before my bench?" The situation has changed. Most of our research
instruments have been sharpened, and many new ones have been
added to the tool chest. The great advance came primarily from the
advance in statistics.
This advance in methods, however, has not been an unmixed
blessing. Sometimes we seem to forget why we count or make
statistical models. This is perhaps less true for our own little field
than for social and political science in general. Today the emphasis
is all on quantification and model-building; simple, clear description
has gone out of fashion. Browsing the other day through recent volumes of one of our political science journals, I could not help comparing nostalgically what I saw with what I remembered as one of the
great studies in that field, Lord Bryce's American Commonwealth."2
To be sure, I had read it at a poignant moment of my life, when I
first came to these shores in 1938. A friend had given it to me "to
read on the boat." If I am not mistaken, we have lost somewhat our
respect for the magnificence of a broad descriptive canvas.
Nevertheless, the great improvement of empirical research came
from the development of statistics. To see this you just have to look
into any journal in the social sciences, anthropology, economics, sociology, or history. Forty years ago it was a rare case that you found
any statistical table. Today it is all the reverse; there is hardly a piece
without some statistics.
In applying all of these precious tools to the law, there is a difficulty. The legal system does not always like to be studied at close
12.

[Ed.] J.

BRYCE, TME AMmucuw CommoNwEALTH (2 vols. 1888).
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range. You all have encountered, I am sure, the difficult negotiations
with judges, policemen, and lawyers to arrange for study and observation. The natural hesitation of a power system to allow others to pry
into its hidden machinery is reinforced by the very real limitations imposed on research by the constitutional guarantees woven into the
system.
It might be highly desirable, for instance, to find out whether a
private defense attorney is more successful than a legal aid attorney
or an assigned counsel. Any good student could easily design the
appropriate experiment. All that is necessary is throw dice as the defendants come up at arraignment and say, "You may hire your own
lawyer, and we will pay him; and you get a lawyer from the legal aid
only" Clearly this would not do; certain rights are guaranteed and
cannot be abridged, and therefore such experiments cannot be made.
The third conclusion I will make about what is a good topic reminds me of a remark made by a physician who is a friend of mine,
"It is not difficult to cure a patient," he said, "to do it quickly and
with little expense, is the doctor's true art." In a way, these are also
the traits of a good research proposal. There should be a balance
between the question and the answer and the amount of money to
be spent, and since our questions are as a pAle modest ones, there
is a special charm about projects that don't cost too much money. The
balance of what we hope to find out and the money expended is of
interest. Nevertheless, it is not decisive. I would be the last one to
say that, having partaken of the magnificent grant for our jury study.
I only say that it is one of the points to consider.
When all is said and done, the point to remember is that we are
engaged in a very special and precise task. Traditionally, lawyers and
legal scholars read constitutions, statutes, and cases, and out of these
elements they build their learned edifices. What we are attempting
to do is to add a new dimension to the realm of legal studies. Law
givers and lawyers have been trained to make learned assumptions
about the foundations and effects of the rules and laws they deal with,
and therefore they are pretty good at making them. We are engaged
in putting these assumptions to the test so that the legal system will
learn more about its functioning and its accomplishments. This broad
vision of our purpose should guide our selection of research topics.
In this effort it is important that we overcome our academic departmentalization. The other day a graduate sociology student from
one of our neighboring universities came to see me to talk about pos-
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sible research themes in the area of sociology of law. We discussed
a number of topics I thought would be suitable. But after a few days
he called back with regrets: his professor thought none of the topics
would be, as he put it, "sociologically interesting." We should cease
asking whether a question is a psychological one, or an economic one,
or a sociological one. What should matter is whether the answer will
be legally interesting. If it is, and if we are reasonably certain we
can find the answer in the course of our investigation-whatever its
special discipline-then we can be sure that we have chosen a good
topic,
I believe this is a good thought to end on for a conference, such
as this, where scholars from many disciplines and fields have come
together to explore the promise of social science in the field of law.
PROFESSOR WALKER: Thank you. Our second speaker this
evening is Dr. Alice Padawer-Singer of Columbia University.
DR. PADAWER-SINGER: The subject for discussion tonight,
the selection of topics and methods in law and social science research,
may be considered from at least two angles. First, what topics and
methods ought to be selected for law and social science research?
Secondly, how does a researcher go about selecting these topics and
methods? I will touch upon both aspects in describing the selection
processJ
First, I would like to make some general observations. I postulate that there is a strong relationship between the characteristics of
topics, methods, and researchers. In addition, the selection process
is influenced by public awareness of problems, available funding, and
institutions such as law schools and research centers which facilitate
the development of research. In general, researchers gravitate to certain topics, although occasionally there may be an element of chance
or practicality (such as whether the research will be funded) which
leads to the choice of a particular subject for research. Charcteristics
of researchers such as academic training, life history, interests, values,
and exposure to ideas of other researchers greatly determine the selection of topics and methods.
Often topics selected for research have the characteristics of high
visibility and importance to the public, but sometimes the topic does
not need to be prominent. Here the notion of "accidental visibility" or
partial visibility must be introduced. A topic may neither "exisf' nor
be "visible" to the public at large but may become "visible" or known

